Network Centric Warfare: Allied Progress
By Christopher Harz
COO, Harz Networks

Network Centric Warfare (NCW), the combat component of what is more broadly termed Network Centric Operations (NCO), appears to be one of the hottest topics in the military and aerospace communities today. It has also been a major topic in the IPv6 community, with major military executives (including the Chief Information Officers of the Army, Air Force and the entire Department of Defense) affirming that the New Internet is a “critical component” of NCW – in other words, that Network Centric Warfare cannot be completely realized without the full implementation of IPv6 throughout the military forces.

The tie-in between NCW and IPv6 is an important one. It is all too easy for technologists to sometimes get lost in their love of the detailed features of the technology itself, and forget the most important part – what benefits it brings to the ultimate customer, which in the military is the warfighter. Analyzing the benefits of IPv6 in the context of NCW offers many insights into what is ultimately possible – and what still remains to be done, with huge challenges in creating the robust and secure mobile multi-layer communications networks that military visionaries see as necessary to modern warfare. NCW is nothing less than a revolutionary approach to what used to be termed command and control, and is now called C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance); even the expansion of the older term is symbolic of how the scope and complexity of moving information between all the nodes of the battlespace has grown.

Simply put, the classic style of command and control (whose basic components were pioneered by Napoleon) consisted of a few vertical channels (often termed “stovepipes”) of information and command flow between headquarters and a few commanders on the ground. In contrast, NCW proponents want a huge expansion of communication channels horizontally, across the battlefield, tied in with air, satellite and naval assets, a virtual three-dimensional cloud of communication nodes. The vision is for a common communication protocol across these nodes – it should be IP-based, and in the case of the US and an increasing number of its allies, it should be IPv6-based. IPv6 brings many obvious features to this type of network, including security, mobility and the ability to assign IP addresses to the many thousands of warfighters in the space, as well as their vehicles, weapons and all the items in the logistics trains.

The trends and requirements of NCW were amply voiced and illustrated at a recent major allied conference, Network Centric Warfare: Europe 2005, which was held in Bonn, Germany, in the old Congressional Hall where modern German democracy was born, before the seat of government was moved to Berlin. Military executives from NATO and other allied nations spoke to their vision of what NCW is, why it is so important, and what progress they have made in implementing it. An overview of their testimony and thoughts follows.

Network Centric Warfare

Network Centric Warfare includes the classic elements of a combat force, including planning, logistics, C4ISR links, combat units and weapons delivery systems. Turning normal warfare into NCW could be said to rest on one basic capability: sharing knowledge in real-time. In theory this sounds simple, but in practice it is anything but, as the subject matter experts and executive leaders at the conference pointed out in great detail.

Each word brings many strata of meaning. “Sharing” implies a balance of interconnected networks that provide 3-dimensional connections to all the elements of a force, which is very different from the narrow vertical “stovepipes” that are common today. “Knowledge” is very different from information – broadband links may provide the ability to fire-hose combat units with information (or even worse, raw data), but this may add little in the way of information, and could in fact even drown out the nuggets of knowledge in a river of irrelevant detail. The generation of knowledge (sometimes called “rich” information) implies the intimate connection of communities of subject matter experts with an effective information flow and the ability to sense “ground truth” – high quality information that is contextualized with reliability and validity, and delivered in comprehensible amounts and via media (especially graphic media) that allow rapid cognition of multidimensional data by the very personnel that need it.

Finally, “real-time” forwarding of shared knowledge implies bypassing the traditional lengthy processes for gathering and digesting information, turning it into knowledge, and then transferring it slowly and painfully through a hierarchy of command levels. Whereas a traditional C4ISR system might have delivered week-old satellite pictures to a ground unit, for instance (which might at that point been chiefly of historical interest), an NCW system could provide close-up UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) video imagery augmented with information “tags” (provided by airborne observers) to a forward combat unit that would use it for actual maneuver planning. The warfighters in the forward unit could then use their IP-based wireless video cameras to deliver live, street-level targeting information that enabled the delivery of remotely launched ordnance. This level of connectivity between what used to be “headquarters” teams and resources and the front lines is known as “power to the edge.”

The Demand for Network Centric Warfare

Why is there such a demand for NCW capabilities? Three dominant reasons emerged at the conference. First, NCW capabilities are necessary for today’s warfare, which has to be much more responsive to quickly changing combat conditions, be adaptable to urban operations, and deliver munitions on an elusive enemy while absolutely minimizing friendly casualties and collateral damage. Gone are the days when commanders had the luxury of months to build up troops and materiel for major campaigns held in open fields, had clearly defined lines of demarcation between their own forces and allied units, could deliver fires upon a clearly identified (and uniformed) enemy, and did not have to worry exceedingly about small numbers of friendly or civilian casualties. Nowadays combat actions can be required almost instantly; combat troops, allies, civilians and the enemy are often in close proximity, and close misses can produce collateral casualties that may seem devastating after nearby journalists issue reports that can be echoed around the world within minutes. NSW can allow new tactics against such an enemy, including the ability to mass firepower without massing forces, to use relatively small combat forces that are both light and lethal, to use precision munitions in conjunction with reliable close-up reports and situation assessments, and to predict enemy movements in order to be proactive instead of merely reactive.

A second reason for NCW is that it is necessary to fulfill what might be called the “top-down” vision of military leaders for Force Transformation, changing the basic approach the military “conducts business” from traditional segmented “one-way” approaches that lacked feedback to more modern methods similar to what large multinational businesses can achieve with enterprise-level communications and procedures. Force Transformation involves the connection and management of the entire “business,” including suppliers and “customers,” from efficiently tracking production and logistics via SCM (Supply Chain Management) to the final procedures of CRM (Customer Relationship Management) – getting feedback from the field as to how well the warfighters are being supported, and relaying that feedback back into a responsive system.

The enthusiasm for NCW at top levels is not universal. Some military executives are worried, for instance, about what disruptions may occur when force elements are able to communicate via a network – similar to the executives, managers and workers in a company all getting email messages instantly and in parallel, instead of getting memoranda sequentially, one level at a time. The ability of an organization to communicate via network instead of just by hierarchy leads to a “flattening” of the management structure, as executives can communicate directly to lower levels, and vice versa. It also leads to the bifurcation of communications and command chains – whereas command responsibility may still be hierarchical, communications can now flow freely in any direction, which may seriously disrupt the perceived roles of middle managers. Several speakers emphasized that major changes in culture will have to occur.

Making this new system work will clearly take leadership, and carefully applied change management techniques. How this will work was elucidated by an impressive array of visionary executive leaders at the conference, including Air Vice Marshall Stephen Dalton (Capability Manager for Information Superiority at the UK MoD), Major General Johann-Georg Dora (Vice Chief of Staff of the German Armed Forces), Major General Lars Christian Fynbo (Head of NATO AGS-3), John Garstka (Asst. Director of Concepts and Operations, Office of Force Transformation, U.S. DoD), Lt. General Charles Johnson (Commander, Electronic Systems Center, USAF), Lt. Gen. (ret’d) Johan Kihl (Former Chief of Staff, Swedish MoD), Rear Admiral Antonio Peca (Asst. Chief of Tel. and Informatics, Italian General Staff), Lt. General Juergen Ruwe (Vice Chief, German Army), Maj. General Charles Simpson (U.S. Joint Staff), Colonel Ralph Thiele (Commander, German MoD Center for Transformation), and Maj. General Ruud van Dam (Assistant Chief of Staff, NATO Allied Command Transformation).

A third reason for NCW is the “bottom-up” groundswell of support from the warfighters. Many young troopers and commanders have grown up with Internet and multimedia capabilities constantly within reach, and see no reason why these should be missing in the field. They are also used to instantly sharing pictures, videos and other files, and their demand for such quick “horizontal fusion” of data runs counter to the traditional vertical command and control stovepipes that provided information to the privileged few at a much more stately pace, definitely not in “Internet time.” One senior U.S. commander who was recently visiting troops in Iraq was astonished to find servers, routers and a whole panoply of IT equipment that supported IP (Internet Protocol) at a local headquarters. Rather than wait for the Army to identify and procure such equipment, the units had simply bought it for themselves! This type of out-of-pocket purchasing has historical precedent – for instance, many Union units during the Civil War, impatient with the War Department’s reluctance to procure the world’s first military repeating rifle (the .52 caliber Spencer), simply bought them with their own funds.

Implications of Network Centric Warfare

The NCW implications for military equipment are far-reaching. Equipment that has been oriented toward NCW will reach over $240 billion over the next 10 years, according to Dean Cash (Maj. Gen., ret’d.), Raytheon’s Director of Network Centric Operations. Equipment to be procured is now measured by its “network centricity,” as well as its ability to function with multiple services (sometimes termed “joint-ness”), its ability to operate with allies, in unit battle spaces that are much larger than were traditionally expected, and its ability to support units that may form and re-form in non-linear fashion (in so-called “ad-hoc” communities), much more like a soccer team with shifting focus than an American football team focused solely on the line of scrimmage.

A major shift in communication capability lies in the need for multimedia data – the warfighters at all levels have rising expectations of receiving not just printed data and voice, but of photos, video, instant messaging, and the timed and layered information provided by GIS (Geographic Information Systems). The U.S. Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), for instance, has platoon-level electronic displays of Blue Force and Red Force dispositions that would have been the envy of some division-level headquarters in decades past. Colonel Peter Fuller, the Project Manager of the SBCT, showed pictures of the interiors of the combat vehicles, which contained not just weapons and crews, but IT racks with routers and diagnostic displays.

A second major shift is from a multitude of analog systems to a common data protocol across the battlespace. This is Internet Protocol, IP, which will be the common “digital language” for joint force and allied force operations. The U.S. has mandated the conversion of its entire Armed Forces to the IP communications transfer standard, and specifically to the new IP standard known as Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), also known as the New Internet, which carries with it the properties of secure transmission of classified data, mobility, end-to-end transmission, and the possibility of endowing thousands or even millions of sensors and tags with their own IP address (because of much greater address availability than is possible with the existing Internet). The German, French, Japanese and Australian Armed Forces have likewise mandated the IPv6 standard to replace today’s kluge of analog devices, and other countries are actively considering it.

This revolutionary new approach was evident at the JTRS (Joint Tactical Radio System) at the Raytheon display. Although JTRS can still function with analog frequencies (under programmable control), its real breakthrough capability is transmission via IP protocol, including IPv6. This radio system, which will be procured by the American Armed Forces in the tens of thousands of units, exemplifies the new era of communications sets, which provide broad and deep networking capability for multimedia data, instead of existing communications systems, which may have some networking capability, but are largely point-to-point links. For the U.S., ground-level network-centric capability such as the JTRS will in turn tie in to the Internet-friendly WIN-T (Warfighter Information Network – Tactical), which will tie in to an upcoming satellite system named TSAT (Transformational SATellite Communications System), essentially a high-speed Internet data network in the sky, which will provide wideband connectivity between the parts of the new overall terrestrial IP-compatible data network, the GIG-BE (Global Information Grid – Broadband Expansion).

Conference Presentations

The conference had a number of keynotes by senior military and business executives. Different Forces tend to use different terms for NCO/NCW, including Net Centric Operations, Network Enabled Capabilities, Net Centric Warfare, FORCEnet (U.S. Navy), Command and Control Constellation (USAF) and LANDWARnet (U.S. Army), but the concepts are very similar. Here is a quick cross-section of the presentations.

Lt. Gen. Dora, Vice Chief of Staff of the German MoD, stated in a keynote that the German Armed Forces were committed to developing NCO, which he defined as the command and control of interconnected network of all command levels, units, individuals, weapons and resources. LTG Dora noted that this new approach would affect not only the C3I technology of the system, but would especially affect the training required of military leaders. German Forces have started to experiment with NCO, to see how well they can develop a CROP (Common Relevant Operational Picture) for joint forces.

Maj. Gen. Simpson of the USAF noted that NCO should produce shared awareness, an increased speed of command and higher OPTEMPO, greater lethality, and increased survivability. He compared the old way of doing business with an organization that built a plane with each part having a different program office, funding and priorities, and then asked the question, “When you finally put all the pieces together – will it fly?” He noted that much work has been done on networking the force, but that the linkage from information availability to awareness is not yet well developed, especially a shared awareness that can lead to self-synchronization (with knowledge of a commander’s intent) and collaboration.

Maj. Gen. (ret’d) Svente Bergh, the Marketing Director of Ericsson Microwave Systems, elucidated how situational information could be shared across disciplines, using open standards, information security, and a tailored response capability. He showed what types of shared services would be available on an NCO network, including GIS, position location, still camera and live video shots, and telemedicine information for injuries and medical status.

Air Vice Marshall Stephen Dalton of the U.K. MoD listed the steps being taken to achieve Network Enabled Capability (NEC). He showed examples of NEC in action, linking sensors and ground units to an Airborne Command Center connected to strike aircraft in a “Sensor to Shooter Chain” (also called a “Kill Chain”). He also listed challenges to NEC, including costs, cyber attack vulnerability, cultural resistance and information overload.

Maj. Gen. (USA ret’d) Dean Cash, Director of NCO Enterprise at Raytheon, discussed the System of Elements concept, where the essential elements of each system (sensors, weapons/effectors, platforms, C2 and communications) are interoperable with those of other systems, and can operate independently or connect functions across platforms. He noted that today we are not taking advantage of the information each systems has – for instance, an Army tank could be sitting next to a Marine Corps tank and not be able to communicate with it. Each element of the force should have its own IP address (via the New Internet IPv6 standard) and be able to communicate across the common digital protocol. He likened the existing state of information sharing in the Armed Forces to a photographer that takes film pictures, has them developed, annotates them and shares them several days or weeks later. In contrast, he showed what is possible today, in a shot of Japanese teenagers at a reception for a rock star – they had high-resolution digital camera phones with which they were taking pictures and video clips, and sharing these (along with commentary) with their friends in real-time.

Major Harrison of the U.K. Attack Helicopter Integrated Project Team gave an example of an actual NCO project that is underway. The networked Apache will have far greater capability for joint operations, particularly for deep, or Beyond Line of Sight (BLoS) strikes. It will use an advanced Mission Planning System (MPS), an integrated SATCOM capability, and achieve Situational Awareness both via connection to central networks as well as collaboration with the other helicopters in the unit. The approach was eclectic, using both new military communications equipment as well as COTS (Commercial Off The Shelf) laptop computers for the crew members.

Maj. Gen. Lars Fynbo of NATO reported on the (AGS) Allied Ground Surveillance System, a NATO-wide effort to provide authorities with real-time information from an airborne platform with a suite of advanced sensors. The AGS is tied in with both ground unit command networks as well as the NATO intelligence network. It has been used not only for military exercises, but also in joint operations with law enforcement units, such as monitoring the recent papal funeral and succession operations in Italy.

There were more than 40 content-rich presentations at Network Centric Warfare Europe 2005; for a complete list of speakers, topics and sponsors, see: http://www.iqpc.com/cgibin/templates/genevent.html?event=6709&topic=221.

The Experts

The author interviewed some of the subject matter experts at the conference; here are some excerpts.

Air Vice Marshall Stephen Dalton
Q: What do you see as some of the major challenges to NCO or NEC in the U.K.?
A: It’s not just a matter of technology, but also of organizational resistance to change. We will have to clearly show the benefits that come with each change to the different force components.

Q: How do you propose to show that?
A: We have started a comprehensive program of live and simulated training exercises employing network-centric capabilities and operations. The results have been dramatic. We intend to continue these important initiatives, using joint forces throughout the U.K. area.

Q: You mentioned information overload as being a major problem. How can you solve that?
A: It will take advanced graphics interface technology for the operator; we have started successful trials of those. I know that it is possible. My teenage daughter plays several videogames, looks up information and chats with her friends over the Internet, all simultaneously. She can manage six different display screens comfortably, quickly and without confusion. So I know it can be done.

John Garstka, Asst. Dir. of Concepts and Operations, U.S. DoD
Q: What is the Transformation Chasm?
A: We are gaining great increases in technology innovation, in networking and sharing information. We are looking forward to innovating and experimenting with new processes and innovations, at the organization and people level. In between is a gap, a chasm where transformation is required, to integrate these two initiatives.

Q: Are there any practical applications of NCO that you would point to?
The Stryker Brigade Combat Team has many of the elements of a successful network centric operation, including a new organizational structure, new operational concepts, advanced networking and C2 capabilities, and synergy between these elements.

Q: Is there a major role for training in NCO?
Absolutely. Future leaders need to know how a networked force fights, as well as the underlying theory of how such a force operates most effectively.

Colonel Ralph Thiele, Commander, Bundeswehr Center for Transformation
Q: What are some of your challenges in transforming the Armed Forces?
A: NCO cannot be achieved by a conservative approach. You must create an NCO mindset.

Q: Are there any NCO-oriented exercises going on between military and first responders such as fire fighters and law enforcement in Germany, in response to terrorist activity or crises?
A: Not at this point. That will be considered in the future.

Q: What is the role of training for NCO?
A: NCO is now becoming an over-arcing element throughout all phases of Armed Forces training. The mindset must be “Networking is the Future.” Leaders must learn how to work within an NCO environment, to collaborate effectively and to conduct Effects Based Operations.

Summary

It is possible to gain a great deal of insight in a well-organized event, such as Network Centric Warfare Europe 2005. It is important to hear national leaders give their vision of the transition to Network Centric Operations and Warfare, and to see operational commanders go into the details of how this would actually work with units in the field, and give examples of networked versus non-networked operations. It is also really useful to get hands-on demonstrations from NCW-oriented equipment makers such as Ericsson, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, IBM, Rockwell Collins, Alcatel, Thales, Rheinmetall, ITT, Selenia and Maersk.

In the absence of such close-up contacts and interaction, reports on NCO can sometimes sound like wish lists, such as, “Everyone should be connected, should be able to talk with one another with a common understanding, they should all be able to work with one another and not make any mistakes, they must have enough bandwidth, etc.” Such reports can sound more like an idyllic Garden of Eden than an affordable or realistic design and procurement plan. With the leaders at this conference, on the other hand, it was clear to see both the urgent need for this type of capability and the level of commitment on the parts of the leaders involved. Network Centric Operations will be a key driver for the Armed Forces of many (not all) of NATO and other nations, and have profound implications on how these forces are structured and organized, trained and equipped. NCO will not be a short range or even long range goal, but an evolving process, which needs the continuous input of military and Industry visionaries such as the leaders that were present at this conference.